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SUMMARY* 
This study examines the effects of ownership transformation from 
the state to the private sector on firm performance in the 
post-privatization period using annual census-type data of 
Hungarian enterprises for the early 2000s. The empirical me-
thodology designed to overcome the data limitations arising from 
an insufficient observation period effectively captured restructuring 
efforts by new owners and company managers and provided strong 
empirical evidence of the close relationship between ownership 
transformation and firm performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The privatization of public enterprises is 
becoming increasingly common 
throughout the world due to the globa-
lization of market principles. This process 
began in the West with the U.K. as it 
adopted a denationalization program 
under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, 
and it then spread to other industrialized 
states and developing countries. At the end 
of the 20th Century, when state socialism 
came to an end, privatization became an 
overriding trend in the international 
political and economic arena. The per-
ception of the boundary separating public 
and private enterprises has changed 
considerably in the last 20 years. The 
denationalization process has grown 
steadily, even in such sectors as post 
services and social securities services, 
which were once believed be traditional 
state-run businesses. 
The philosophical foundation of the 
widespread privatization of public en-
terprises currently observed in many 
countries lies in the high degree of trust 
in the overwhelming advantage of private 
over public ownership in terms of effi-
ciency. Many citizens now expect that the 
transfer of public firms to private owners 
could alleviate the financial burden of the 
state as well as significantly improve the 
management efficiency of privatized firms 
themselves, contributing significantly to the 
betterment of society. Accordingly, it 
becomes an important subject of con-
temporary economics to ascertain whether 
such an expectation is feasible. In response 
to this demand, many studies pioneered by 
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh 
(1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998) 
were conducted, which repeatedly verified 
the positive change in firm performance 
before and after privatization through case 
analyses of industrialized and developing 
countries. In addition, it is almost certain 
that the effect was observed in enterprise 
privatization in former socialist states, 
including Russia (Djankov and Murrell 
2002, Iwasaki 2007a). 
On the other hand, however, most of the 
previous studies fall short in identifying 
whether these effects are due to the 
privatization process itself or to other 
factors (Omran 2004). Furthermore, many 
studies focusing on the effect of a new 
ownership structure on a firm’s per-
formance following privatization fail to 
identify a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the two elements. This is 
particularly so for studies covering 
transition economies (Dewenter and 
Malatesta 2001, Harper 2002, Megginson 
2005, Aussenegg and Jelic 2007). 
Therefore, despite the strong belief of 
economists in the superiority of the private 
sector over the state regarding ownership 
structure, no empirical study on priva-
tization has presented a definitive con-
clusion regarding this point. 
Using annual census-type data of 
Hungarian enterprises for the early 2000s, 
we analyze the impact of ownership 
transformation from the state to the private 
sector on firm performance in the 
post-privatization period. Unlike Russia 
and the Czech Republic, Hungary avoided 
giving away public assets to private in-
terests as much as possible and, instead, 
thoroughly pursued the direct sale of 
public assets to strategic investors, in-
cluding foreigners. This privatization 
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strategy was, in principle, applied to all 
industries across the country. As a result, 
almost all of 1,859 former socialist en-
terprises designated in 1990 as 
to-be-privatized firms had become com-
pletely privately owned or liquidated by the 
end of the 1990s.1 This policy approach 
and the accumulated experience during 
the large-scale privatization period were 
substantially passed on to the privatization 
process in the early 2000s, leading to the 
steady privatization of dozens of gov-
ernment-owned companies left in the 
portfolio of the Hungarian Privatization 
and State Holding Company (ÁPV Rt.) and 
other public firms, mainly through open 
bidding. Due to this firm policy of the 
Hungarian government, the share of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the total 
number of employees and total add-
ed-value for 2002 (2005) shrank to 15.0% 
(12.0%) and 17.6% (15.6%), respectively, 
suggesting that the state sector is now 
playing only a supplementary role in the 
Hungarian national economy (KSH 2003, 
2006). 
Unlike the early transitional period, 
which witnessed an economic crisis 
triggered by the collapse of the COMECON 
system and large-scale institutional 
changes leading toward a market economy, 
the early 2000s is a suitable time to 
investigate the relationship between the 
privatization and firm performance in 
Hungary because of the stability of the 
social and economic circumstances and the 
legal system at the time. Furthermore, as 
                                                        
1 There are many studies of enterprise privati-
zation in Hungary during its early transition 
period: for the institutional framework and history 
of the privatization policies in Hungary, see Mihályi 
(1998), Macher (2000), Szanyi (2000), Major 
(2003) and Voszka (2003), and, for the evaluation 
of the privatization policies, see Bartlett (2000), 
Mihályi (2001), Hanley, King and János (2001), and 
Báger and Kovácz (2004). 
explained later, the data we employ cover 
almost all business firms, including SOEs, 
therefore ensuring the representation of 
the Hungarian corporate sector. The data 
available, however, limits any study of 
performance among these companies to 
two years after privatization. An insuf-
ficient observation period poses a sig-
nificant obstacle to empirical analysis of 
the effects of privatization policies. 
To deal with this problem, we present 
a new empirical approach, which nearly 
ensures to identify the impacts of own-
ership transformation even if short-term 
data are used. The essence of the proposed 
methodology is to reject the null-hypothesis 
that the effects of ownership transfor-
mation are zero by regressing a variety of 
performance indices into the scale and the 
type of ownership transformation and then 
synthesizing the estimates (effect size) 
using meta-analysis techniques, in order to 
fully capture restructuring efforts by new 
owners and managers of privatized en-
terprises. Although meta-analysis is a 
statistical method basically designed to 
combine estimates across independent 
research studies, it is also quite effective 
in summarizing various tests conducted 
within a single study (Hunter and Schmidt 
2004). The approach in this study focuses 
on the latter function of meta-analysis. 
Because everything is self-contained when 
conducting meta-analysis, we can prevent 
the so-called publication bias and other 
problems from occurring due to the lack 
of commonality of model structures and 
variables. Moreover, the researcher’s ar-
bitrariness can be effectively eliminated by 
setting no limitations on the firm per-
formance to be analyzed. 
Our empirical analysis confirmed that 
the ownership transformation from the 
state to the private sector has statistically 
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and economically significant impacts on 
post-privatization firm performance in 
Hungary. We also found that there are 
clear differences in the performance 
improvement effects among privatization 
implemented with no lower limit on the 
scale of ownership transformation, pri-
vatization with strategic control rights, and 
full privatization. Moreover, we found that 
the ownership transformation to foreign 
investors has greater positive impacts on 
firm performance than that to domestic 
investors. These results were obtained with 
due consideration to the selection bias of 
the privatization decision by the Hungarian 
government and acquisitions by foreign 
investors and by controlling other potential 
determinants on firm performance in the 
post-privatization period. The advantage of 
using regression coefficients in me-
ta-analysis over using odds rates or single 
correlation coefficients is that multivariate 
regression makes it easier to take such 
analytical measures when estimating the 
effect size of ownership transformation. 
The remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. Section 1 presents 
testable hypotheses. Section 2 describes the 
data employed for this study. Section 3 
reviews our empirical methodology. Section 
4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
1) OWNERSHIP TRANSFOR-
MATION AND FIRM      
PERFORMANCE: TESTABLE 
HYPOTHESES 
Theoretically, privatization gain originates 
in the context of the relative inefficiency 
of the state compared with the private 
sector. From a political viewpoint, public 
enterprises should pursue strategies to 
achieve the public or political objectives of 
the politicians and bureaucrats who 
control them. However, such management 
goals often conflict with profit maximi-
zation, distorting the incentive structure 
and the constraints regarding company 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). As 
seen in the fact that government subsidies 
are more likely to be criticized by tax 
payers and opposition parties when they 
are paid to specific private firms than 
when they are provided to public entities, 
privatization raises transaction costs for 
the use of political influences over firms’ 
decision-making, thereby inhibiting in-
tervention by politicians and bureaucrats 
and promoting firm restructuring (Sap-
pington and Stiglitz 1987). 
From the viewpoint of corporate finance 
and firm organization, the governance 
structure in SOEs is particularly prob-
lematic. For instance, the lack of trans-
ferability of the property rights of public 
firms inhibits the capitalization of future 
consequences into current transfer prices, 
resulting in damaging incentives for 
managerial supervision by residual 
claimants (De Allesi 1980). In addition, 
although the cash flow of SOEs ultimately 
belongs to the taxpayer, each share is 
trivial, which prevents citizens from 
organizing to overcome the free-rider 
problem and, hence, from exercising their 
influence over control-holding managers 
(Bennedsen 2000). Moreover, compared 
with private firms, public companies are 
effectively protected from the threat of 
takeover and bankruptcy. As long as the 
government announces that no financial 
crisis is at hand, management discipline 
and budget constraints in SOEs are in-
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evitably looser (Haskel and Szymanski 
1992, OECD 2005). Furthermore, the fact 
that SOEs are remote from both capital 
and managerial markets poses a serious 
impediment to the development of ma-
nagerial discipline and to securing ef-
fective monitoring from the outside. 
Transfer of ownership to the private sector 
greatly alleviates these governance 
problems and thus functions as a political 
measure for creating more effective 
control (Goldstein 1997). 
Nevertheless, some argue that private 
companies do not always outperform 
public ones (Boardman, Eckel, and Vining 
1986, Kole and Mulherin 1997, Kwoca 
2005, Ang and Ding 2006). It is also likely 
that some state regulations and admin-
istrative measures may make it possible for 
SOEs to achieve better performance than 
private firms operating in the same 
product market, and the fact that SOEs are 
fully government-dependent may give 
more confidence to markets and customers 
than private firms do, ceteris paribus. 
Normally, privatization is involved with the 
partial or complete removal of favorable 
conditions to state firms. There is no 
guarantee that privatized firms can achieve 
the same performance as they previously 
did under state protection, even after 
facing the worsening of the managerial 
environment in the above sense. As LaPorta 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) suggest, the 
financial and operating performance of 
privatized enterprises tends to converge to 
that of private firms. This rule is also 
assumed to be applicable when SOEs have 
an advantage over private firms. Accor-
dingly, we present a neutral hypothesis 
with respect to the effects of ownership 
transformation on firm performance: 
Hypothesis H1: Ownership 
transformation from state to 
private owners changes the fi-
nancial and operating perfor-
mance of privatized firms to-
wards reducing the gap between 
the state and the private sector. 
On the other hand, the effect of 
ownership transformation on 
post-privatization performance is not a 
monotonic increasing function for the 
degree of privatization even if there is 
room to seek privatization gains. Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1996) argue that 
privatization works when strategic control 
rights transfer from the state (or politi-
cians) to managers. To achieve this goal, 
private investors must acquire at least a 
majority of ownership. 2  In fact, many 
earlier studies report that privatized firms 
exhibited stronger performance im-
provements after their majority control 
was sold by the government (Eckel, Eckel, 
and Singal 1997, D’Souza and Megginson, 
1999, Boubakri, Cosset, and Gueghami 
2005, Omran 2007, Chen et al. 2008). 
Renunciation of strategic control by the 
state sends a good signal to company 
managers and private investors that it has 
no further intention of intensive political 
intervention and future re-nationalization, 
increasing the motivation of managers and 
private owners for firm restructuring. 
Nevertheless, the retention of strategic 
control rights by private entities does not 
provide a satisfactory solution, although it 
makes it significantly easier for private 
investors to resist government interven-
tions that are likely to damage the 
corporate value or to have a negative 
impact on profit maximization. As 
                                                        
2 As in other OECD countries, the Corporate Law 
in Hungary stipulates that simple majority voting 
is the standard decision-making procedure, except 
for matters requiring an extraordinary resolution 
(2006. évi IV. törvény – a gazdaságj társaságokról 
20 § (6)). 
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Broadman and Vining (1989) argue, 
partial privatization is still not sufficient to 
eliminate conflicts of interest between the 
government and the private sector. Em-
pirical evidence that private firms out-
perform not only SOEs but also mixed 
enterprises is considered to support this 
statement (Vining and Broadman 1992, 
Majumdar 1996, Konings 1997). Based on 
the above discussions, we derive the 
following hypothesis with respect to the 
marginal effects of ownership transfor-
mation on the financial and operating 
performance of privatized firms: 
Hypothesis H2: The marginal 
effects of the transfer of strategic 
control rights on 
post-privatization firm perfor-
mance are larger than those of 
ownership transformation without 
a lower limit, and the marginal 
effects of full privatization 
surpass those of partial priva-
tization. 
The effects of ownership transformation 
are also greatly affected by the types of 
new ownership. In this regard, foreign 
participation can be a strong driving force 
for the restructuring of newly privatized 
firms. Foreign investors have a great deal 
of potential to provide enterprises ac-
quired from the state with sophisticated 
expertise, including management 
know-how and production technologies 
accumulated in developed countries, as 
well as with greater access to new markets 
and new capital resources. In addition, 
they have a strong tendency to demand 
accountability in accordance with inter-
national standards from company man-
agers in an effort to assess their per-
formance on the basis of strict criteria 
(Dyck 2001, D’Souza, Megginson and 
Nash 2005b). With these advantages, 
foreign owners are highly likely to make 
remarkable positive contributions to 
former socialist economies, which are 
characterized by poor management and 
production techniques, a closed domestic 
market, an underdeveloped financial 
system, and a weak corporate governance 
system. In fact, many researchers find a 
positive causality between foreign par-
ticipation in management and firm 
performance in transition economies 
(Frydman et al. 1999, Kocenda and 
Svejnar 2002, Weill 2003, Yudaeva et al. 
2003, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar 
2007). There are also many studies 
reporting similar empirical results with 
respect to Hungary (Szekeres 2001, Novák 
2002, Hamar 2004, Hasan and Marton 
2003, Perotti and Vesnaver 2004, Makó 
2005, Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 2006, 
Colombo and Stanca 2006, Iwasaki 
2007b). 
In contrast to foreign investors, do-
mestic investors in the post-communist 
states are more sensitive to political in-
fluence from regional governments and 
local magnates as well as more prone to 
be motivated by interests other than profit 
maximization, such as the attainment of 
social prestige or a relationship with local 
citizens. Furthermore, it has been re-
peatedly pointed out from both the 
theoretical and empirical perspectives that 
insiders, who often buy out privatized 
enterprises in transitional countries, are 
quite problematic as key players in 
corporate restructuring aimed at the 
improvement of profitability and prod-
uctivity (Aoki and Kim 1995, Blanchard 
and Aghion 1996, Li 1998, Filatotchev, 
Wright, and Bleaney 1999, Megginson and 
Netter 2001). We, therefore, will test the 
following hypothesis with respect to the 
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relationship between types of investors and 
firm performance: 
Hypotheses H3: Ownership 
transformation to foreign in-
vestors has larger positive impacts 
on improvement in the financial 
and operating performance of 
privatized firms than that to 
domestic investors. 
From the next section onwards, we will 
verify the three hypotheses discussed above 
by combining large-scale panel data of 
Hungarian firms and a new empirical 
methodology. 
2) DATA 
The data underlying our empirical analysis 
are annual census-type data of Hungarian 
firms, which were compiled from financial 
statements associated with tax reporting 
submitted to the National Tax Authority in 
Hungary by legal entities using 
double-sided bookkeeping. The observation 
period is four years from 2002 through 
2005. The data cover all industries and 
contain basic information of each entry, 
including the NACE 4-digit industrial 
classification, annual average number of 
employees, and total assets, sales, and 
other financial indices. In addition, the 
locations of firms are identical to the 
extent that they are divided into the capital 
region, including Budapest and Pest 
County, the western region, made up of 
nine counties, and the eastern region, 
comprising nine counties.3 
                                                        
3 For details, see notes in Table 1. Due to the state 
regulation on the disclosure of official census data, 
more specific location information is not available 
for our research. 
Information about ownership structure 
includes the total amount of capital 
(subscribed equity) at the end of the 
calendar year and its share of state, 
domestic, and foreign private investors. 
The data, therefore, allow us to know the 
timing and scale of ownership trans-
formation from the state to the private 
sector. In this paper, the following defi-
nition applies: privatization has been 
carried out in year t if there was a relative 
decrease in the proportion of state 
ownership between the previous and 
current years. 
All nominal values are deflated with the 
base year being 2002. As Sgard (2001) 
and Claessens and Djankov (2002) in-
dicate, firm-specific price indices are not 
available in Hungary. Hence, following the 
steps taken by these two studies, we use 
the consumer price index, the industrial 
producer price index, and the investment 
price index reported by the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office as alternative 
deflators. 
Although the data are basically reliable, 
a number of values are missing, and 
unrealistic or inconsistent input values are 
included. To correct this problem, we 
carefully cleaned the data to remove 
inconsistencies and to eliminate samples 
containing missing values and, hence, 
posing an impediment to our empirical 
analysis. 
The data form an unbalanced panel 
having additional new entry and exit of 
enterprises during the observation period. 
Since we have no information concerning 
these firms, none of these samples was 
used in the empirical analysis. In this 
regard, nothing was found to indicate that 
samples containing missing and abnormal 
values and newly entering and exiting 
enterprises were much more biased to-
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ward certain categories of firms in terms 
of industrial sector, firm size, location, and 
financial performance than other samples. 
With regard to the sample group for 
2002, Table 1 shows the total number of 
enterprises, the basic statistics of the 
number of employees and equity capital, 
and the composition by region and in-
dustrial sector for both private firms and 
SOEs. This table also reports the frequency 
distribution of the proportion of state 
ownership in the latter. One-man com-
panies are excluded because ownership 
structure is not a crucial issue for 
corporate management in these firms. As 
a result of the extensive data cleaning and 
exclusion of one-man companies, 99,315 
firms were left out in our dataset. This is 
about half the number of samples in the 
original data. According to official sta-
tistics, the 98,367 private firms and 948 
SOEs covered here account for 84.2% of 
all private firms and 81.6% of all public 
enterprises in Hungary, respectively, in 
terms of the total number of employees in 
2002. 
In Table 1, we can also confirm the 
following: first, the average size of SOEs 
is larger than that of private firms in terms 
of both the number of employees and the 
amount of equity capital; second, the 
degree of geographical concentration of 
SOEs in the capital region is slightly 
moderate compared with that of private 
firms; and third, the share of the 
agriculture, forestry, and hunting and 
fishing sector in the industrial composition 
of SOEs is as much as 20% higher than 
that of private firms, whereas the share of 
wholesale and retail trade companies in the 
total number of SOEs is 18% lower than 
that of private firms. Furthermore, Table 1 
reveals that more than half of SOEs are 
100% government-owned and firms with 
less than 50% state ownership account for 
only 27% of all SOEs. We take these facts 
into account in the empirical analysis. 
3) EMPIRICAL                
METHODOLOGY 
As pointed out by Kocenda and Svejnar 
(2003), using a small and unrepresentative 
samples of firms as well as a short 
observation period could pose a serious 
impediment to empirically examining the 
effects of privatization policies in de-
veloping and transition economies. With 
the development of state statistical systems 
and private company information services, 
the problems associated with short ob-
servation periods and small samples are 
diminishing because of the increasing 
availability of large-scale sample sets. 
Although solutions are being found to 
overcome the short observations, the real 
difficulty is with the type of firm to be 
observed rather than with the observers. In 
other words, the shorter life cycles of firms 
and the more frequent changes in company 
profiles in developing and transitional 
countries than in developed countries are 
major obstacles to tracing the effects of 
enterprise privatization from a mid- and 
long-term perspective. The other related 
issue is the scarcity and distortion of 
information concerning the management 
and performance of SOEs, especially in 
former socialist states. This defect con-
siderably limits the application of the 
empirical method advocated by Megginson, 
Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994) into 
transition economies for the detection of 
privatization gains through comparing 
firm performance before and after 
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privatization. Unfortunately, there seems to 
be no instant solution to this situation. 
Researchers often attempt to identify 
privatization gains by looking at changes 
in profitability and productivity in a 
narrow sense. This approach makes a lot 
of sense because those changes are directly 
related to improvements in corporate value 
and shareholder wealth. However, if 
profitability or productivity is increased as 
a result of multifaceted improvements in 
business strategies, firm organization, and 
production systems, the use of short-term 
observation data may lead to the failure 
to detect the end products of those 
managerial efforts. With this in mind, an 
empirical study should be conducted to 
cover a broad range of performance 
indices, including short-term ones, which 
are more operational for new owners and 
managers of ex-state companies, focusing 
on the byproduct of the process of firm 
restructuring at hand. By covering as 
many performance indices as practicable, 
the statistical power of hypothesis tests is 
also expected to be enhanced due to 
increased information about the effects of 
ownership transformation on firm per-
formance. This is the reason that we 
perform panel data regressions taking a 
variety of performance indices as de-
pendent variables and then synthesize 
these estimates using meta-analysis 
techniques to examine the testable hy-
potheses presented in Section 1. 
Our empirical analysis broadly consists 
of five stages. At the first stage, as a 
prerequisite for verifying hypothesis H1, we 
conduct comparative analysis using de-
scriptive statistics of 100% SOEs and 
private firms in order to identify in which 
aspects of firm performance state own-
ership is inferior or superior to private 
ownership. This procedure aims to identify 
the potential source of privatization gains. 
The comparison is carried out between 
499 fully government-funded companies 
listed on Table 1 and approximately 
90,000 private firms whose distribution of 
firm sizes, locations, and industrial 
compositions is, for the most part, identical 
to that of the above fully SOEs. We exclude 
mixed enterprises, in which ownership 
structure and firm performance are highly 
likely to be determined endogenously, from 
all stages of our empirical analysis because 
the main research interest in this study lies 
in how the exogenous privatization de-
cision made by the government affects firm 
performance in the post-privatization 
period. 
The comparison is made with respect to 
a total of 23 financial and operating 
indices from 5 areas routinely utilized by 
company executives and investment 
analysts worldwide, including Hungary. 
They consist of the following: (i) 7 indices 
of profitability (ordinary income to total 
assets (ROI)/value-added to 
sales/operating income to sales/ordinary 
income to sales/return on equity 
(ROE)/return on total assets 
(ROA)/ordinary income on equity); (ii) 7 
indices of productivity (value-added per 
employee/operating income per em-
ployee/ordinary income per employee/sales 
per employee/sales to employment/sales to 
total costs/fixed investment efficiency); (iii) 
2 indices of financial ability (total assets 
turnover/fixed assets turnover); (iv) 2 
indices of financial soundness (fixed 
ratio/capital adequacy ratio (CAR)); and 
(v) 5 indices of firm growth (sales 
growth/value-added growth/operating 
income growth/ordinary income 
growth/total assets growth).4 The number 
                                                        
4 The following indices are defined as shown: fixed 
investment efficiency = value-added/total fixed 
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of employees and average employee salary 
are not investigated, since it is theoretically 
unclear how a change in these two va-
riables would affect the corporate re-
structuring of privatized firms in con-
temporary Hungary after the dozen years 
since the collapse of the communist regime. 
The second stage traces when and how 
much ownership of which companies was 
transferred to the private sector among the 
above 499 SOEs in the 3 years from 2003 
to 2005. At this stage, in order to identify 
the presence and extent of selection bias 
regarding the privatization decision of the 
government and foreign participation in 
the management of privatized firms, we 
carry out univariate comparisons of the 
privatized firms and remaining SOEs and 
the firms acquired by domestic investors 
and those by foreign investors in terms of 
pre-privatization company size and firm 
performance. We also perform multiva-
riate regression, taking the probability of 
privatization and that of foreign acqui-
sition as dependent variables. 
In the third stage, we conduct a panel 
estimation of the impact of ownership 
transformation on post-privatization firm 
performance. The 23 performance indices 
reported above are regressed into the scale 
and type of ownership transformation 
while controlling the other potential de-
terminants. We estimate the following 
regression equation: 
itiiiit Zxy εδγαµ ++′++= ,( )iKii zzZ ,,1 K= ,                   (1) 
where yit represents firm i’s performance 
for year t, xi is an ownership variable, Zi 
is a K × 1 vector of control variables, µ 
is a constant term, α and γ are parameters 
of interest to be estimated, δi is the 
                                                                                    
assets; total (fixed) assets turnover = sales/total 
assets (fixed assets); and fixed ratio = total fixed 
assets/equity capital. 
individual effects, and εit is an error term.
5 
The regression model taking an ownership 
variable with no lower limit to the scale 
of ownership transformation is Model I. 
We use the estimation results of this model 
to examine hypothesis H1. We also estimate 
Model II, in which limitations are placed 
on the scope of ownership variables to be 
investigated into the impact of the transfer 
of strategic control rights (i.e., 50% or 
more ownership), and Model III, which is 
exclusively applied to the cases of full 
privatization. The estimation results of the 
latter two regression models are used for 
verifying hypothesis H2 with those of 
Model I. To test hypothesis H3 regarding 
the relationship between types of new 
ownership and firm performance, we 
estimate Model IV and Model V, which 
regress post-privatization firm perfor-
mance into an ownership transformation 
ratio to domestic investors and foreign 
investors, respectively, and compare the 
estimates of these two models. 
Further, according to Claessens and 
Djankov (2002), who documented changes 
in the performance of over 6,000 firms in 
seven Eastern European countries in the 
early 1990s, it takes several years for the 
privatization benefits at the firm level to 
become noticeable. The panel data used in 
this study deals with time lags of up to two 
years. Thereupon, with regard to Model I, 
we estimate a regression equation that 
takes the ownership transformation ratio in 
the current year (xit) as an ownership 
variable and call it Model Ia. We also 
perform estimations of Models Ib and Ic, 
which regress firm performance into a 
one-year lag ownership variable (xit-1) and 
a two-year lag ownership variable (xit-2), 
                                                        
5 We hypothesize that no change in ownership 
structure had been made for two years before 
privatization. 
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respectively. We label these three re-
gression equations as the Model I family. 
The same estimation procedure is adopted 
for Models II to V. Consequently, our panel 
estimation is based on a total of 15 types 
of regression equations classified into one 
of 5 model families. 
In order to fully identify the effects of 
ownership transformation, our regression 
model controls the following potential 
determinants of firm performance: the 
sales share of each firm to represent its 
position in the product market; the median 
of the dependent variable for the sector 
each firm belongs to, calculated from 
about 10,000 effective samples, to capture 
the sector’s market fluctuation; the 
sales-based Herfindahl index to proxy for 
the degree of market concentration of the 
sector each firm belongs to; industry fixed 
effects; time effects; and region-specific 
fixed effects. The firm’s market position, 
the market fluctuation and market con-
centration level of the sector it belongs to, 
and industry fixed effects are all based on 
the NACE two-digit level. In addition, to 
avoid simultaneous bias with the de-
pendent variable, a predetermined variable 
for the previous term is used for the firm’s 
market position and the degree of market 
concentration of the sector it belongs to. 
We estimate the above regression 
models using three panel estimators: fixed 
effects, random effects, and pooled OLS 
with cluster effects on the NACE two-digit 
level.  
The fourth stage synthesizes the re-
gression coefficients of ownership va-
riables using the estimation results of 
models selected on the basis of the 
Hausman test to test the random-effects 
assumption and the Breusch-Pagan test to 
test the null-hypothesis that the variance of 
the individual effects is zero. We set the 
critical value for both of these specification 
tests at the 10% level of significance. 
The following method is applied for 
synthesizing regression coefficients. 
Suppose there are N independent studies. 
Here, the “effect size” estimate of the n-th 
study is labeled as Tn, and the corres-
ponding population and standard devia-
tion, as θn and ns , respectively (n=1, …, 
N). We assume that estimate Tn is normally 
distributed (Tn ~ N(θn, 2ns )). We also 
assume that θ1 = θ2 = … = θN = θ, implying 
that each study in a meta-analysis estimates 
the common underlying population effect 
and the estimates differ only by random 
sampling errors. An asymptotically effi-
cient estimator of the unknown true 
population parameter θ is a weighted 
mean by the inverse variance of each 
estimate: 
∑∑ === Nn nNn nn wTwT 11 ,          (2) 
where nn vw 1= and 2nn sv = . The variance 
of T is given by: ( ) ∑ == Nn nwT 11var .               (3) 
This is the meta fixed-effects model. In 
order to utilize this method, we need to 
confirm that the estimates are homoge-
neous. A homogeneity test uses the statistic: ( )∑
=
−=
N
n
nnT TTwH
1
2
,              (4) 
which has a Chi-square distribution with 
N-1 degrees of freedom. The 
null-hypothesis is rejected if HT exceeds the 
critical value. In this case, we assume that 
heterogeneity exists among the studies and 
adapt a random-effects model that in-
corporates the sampling variation due to 
an underlying population of effect sizes as 
well as the study-level sampling error. If 
the deviation between estimates is ex-
pressed as 2θδ , the unconditional variance 
of the n-th estimate is given by ( )2θδ+= nun vv . 
In the meta random-effects model, the 
population θ is estimated by replacing the 
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weight wn with the weight un
u
n vw 1= in Eq. 
(2). 6  For the between-studies variance 
component, we use the method-of-moment 
estimator computed by the next equation 
using the value of the homogeneity test 
statistic HT obtained from Eq. (4): 
)(
)1(ˆ
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θδ .   (5) 
In other words, the fourth stage verifies 
the testable hypotheses on the basis of the 
value of the synthesized regression 
coefficients and its statistical significance 
by adopting either the meta fixed-effects 
model or the meta random-effects model 
according to the results of the homogeneity 
test. At this stage, we also make use of the 
p-value combination method and the 
vote-counting method, both of which are 
more conventional meta-analysis tech-
niques, to supplement the results from the 
synthesis of regression coefficients.7 
At the last fifth stage, we conduct a 
meta-regression analysis. 8 This quantita-
tive method has a great advantage in 
strictly interpreting the differences in the 
results of panel estimation, and, thus, it 
can be an effective means for supple-
menting the results of meta-analysis at the 
fourth stage. We estimate the following 
meta-regression model: 
,
1
0 n
M
m
nmmn eWT ++= ∑
=
ββ   ,,...,1 Nn =  (6) 
                                                        
6 This means that the meta fixed-effect model is 
a special case based on the assumption that 02 =θδ . 
7 For more details on the meta-analysis methods, 
see Hedges and Olkin (1985), Hedges (1992), and 
Keef and Roberts (2004). 
8  Called “the regression analysis of regression 
analyses” (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989), this method 
is now increasingly applied in economics to 
summarize the empirical literature. Among the 
recent studies using this technique are those by 
Nelson (2006), Connor and Bolotova (2006), 
Brander, Van Beukering, and Cesar (2007), and 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008). In the literature 
on transition economies, Fidrmuc and Korhonen 
(2006) practice this method. 
where β0 represents the effects of own-
ership transformation under the default 
conditions (Wnm=0), Wnm is a me-
ta-independent variable including the 
characteristics of the panel regression 
model and observations that are consi-
dered to create differences in estimation 
results, βm denotes a meta-regression 
coefficient to be estimated, and en is an 
error term. 
To reexamine our testable hypotheses, 
we use dummy variables that identify 
whether the dependent variable yit in the 
panel regression model is a superior or 
inferior performance index to private 
firms in comparison with fully SOEs as well 
as dummy variables that capture the 
differences in the scale and type of 
ownership transformation. In addition, we 
check the sensitivity of the overall esti-
mation results of the panel regressions by 
incorporating into the meta-regression 
model such independent variables that 
capture the time lags of the ownership 
variables, the industrial sector, the qua-
litative difference in performance indices, 
and the difference in panel estimators, and 
a dummy variable, which is equal to one 
if an effect size is obtained from the 
regression model selected according to the 
model specification tests, as well as the 
number of observations used in the panel 
estimation. 
To estimate meta-regression models, 
most preceding studies have employed one 
or a combination of a weighted least 
square (WLS) estimator with the number 
of observations or standard errors as 
analytical weights, a meta random-effects 
estimator using the restricted maximum 
likelihood (RML) method or the 
non-iterative moment method, or a meta 
mixed-effects estimator using the RML 
method. In order to check the robustness 
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of the estimation results, we adopt all five 
of these estimators. We also perform 
regressions by using all panel estimates as 
the dependent variables and by exclusively 
using the estimates of models selected by 
the specification tests. 
4) RESULTS 
Tables 1 through 8 present the main results 
of our empirical analyses. In this section, 
we summarize and interpret these results 
as well as explain the methodological 
procedure in detail. 
 
A. Performance Comparison between      
Private and Full State-Owned       
Enterprises 
 
Table 2 shows univariate comparisons 
between private and fully SOEs using 23 
performance indices. According to the 
results covering the entire corporate sector 
(panel A), Hungary’s SOEs are generally 
inferior to its private firms. In fact, 18 of 
the 23 indices demonstrated the superiority 
of private firms over SOEs at the 10% or 
lower significance level either by a t-test 
or a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. These indices 
are hereinafter referred to as the 
“SOE-inferior indices.” This is one of the 
political reasons that the Hungarian 
government has been and is still promoting 
the privatization of public firms. 
Nevertheless, when looking into the four 
individual sectors (panels B-E), perfor-
mance gaps between fully SOEs and 
private firms vary significantly from 
industry to industry. For example, in the 
service sector, 13 of the 23 performance 
indices apply to the SOE-inferior indices, 
whereas, in the agriculture, forestry, 
hunting, and fishing sector, only 7 indices 
apply. In addition, no particular common 
trend is observed among the four sectors 
regarding the structure of the comparison 
results. On the other hand, turning to the 
performance indices showing the statis-
tically significant superiority of SOEs over 
private firms (hereinafter “SOE-superior 
indices”), the capital adequacy ratio for 
SOEs is much higher than that for private 
firms in all sectors. Furthermore, in the 
agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 
sector, SOEs outperform private firms in 
six performance indices, and, in the 
manufacturing sector, SOEs perform 
better than private firms in terms of the 
ordinary income-to-equity ratio. Moreover, 
there are 42 test results demonstrating no 
statistically significant performance gaps 
between the two corporate sectors (he-
reinafter “difference-insignificant indices”), 
accounting for 46% of all results. As 
discussed in Section I, if a privatization 
gain can be attributed to the comparative 
inefficiency of public firms, the effects of 
enterprise privatization are considered to 
have become noticeable in more limited 
situations than expected in Hungary of the 
early 2000s. 
 
B. Privatization Process of State-Owned 
Enterprises and Selection Bias 
 
Table 3 shows that, of 499 companies that 
were fully government-owned as of the 
end of 2002, 313, or 62.7%, partially or 
entirely transferred their property rights to 
the private sector over the three years up 
to 2005. This table also shows that most 
of these firms were privatized in 2003. 
This is probably due to the policies adopted 
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by the Hungarian government9 facing the 
need to restructure public finance and to 
further promote deregulation in the 
domestic market toward EU accession in 
2004.10 This provides a favorable condi-
tion for measuring the time-lag effects of 
ownership transformation for two con-
secutive terms. 
The statistics on the scale of ownership 
transformation indicate that a vast majority 
of these 313 SOEs, including 24, or 7.7%, 
acquired by foreign investors, are fully 
privatized. Looking at the regional and 
industrial compositions of privatized firms, 
we confirm that the sales of public en-
terprises were conducted in all industries 
on a nationwide scale. This reveals that the 
Hungarian government had been con-
sistent in actively pursuing ownership 
transformation to strategic investors 
beyond industrial and regional bounda-
ries. 
Nevertheless, because the government’s 
privatization decision is a highly political 
matter and because the sale of SOEs is also 
influenced by bidding private investors, a 
statistically significant bias may occur 
between privatized firms and the re-
maining SOEs. Hence, in measuring the 
effects of ownership transformation on 
firm performance in the post-privatization 
period, it is indispensable to know the 
presence and extent of the selection bias. 
                                                        
9  In May 2002, Péter Medgyessy formed a 
coalition government of the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ) as a result of the fourth post-communist 
parliamentary elections. Aiming at early fulfillment 
of Hungary’s EU accession and entry into the EURO 
zone, the Medgyessy administration took political 
measures to promote market-oriented structural 
reform and tight fiscal policies. 
10  All four enterprises, which had experienced 
privatizations twice until 2005, transferred more 
than 50% of their property rights to private 
investors at the first privatization, whereas they 
sold a much smaller percentage (8-12%) at the 
second privatization. 
In the case of this research, we should also 
consider possible differences in behavioral 
patterns between domestic and foreign 
investors. 
To evaluate these aspects, we compare 
privatized firms and remaining SOEs and 
privatized firms acquired by domestic 
investors and those acquired by foreign 
investors in 2003 in terms of company size 
and firm performance in the previous year. 
According to the results presented in Table 
4, the company size of privatized firms is 
much smaller than that of the remaining 
SOEs, while the firm performance of the 
former is better than that of the latter, 
especially in terms of productivity and 
financial ability indices (panel A). Similarly, 
firms acquired by foreign investors are 
larger in size than firms acquired by 
domestic investors, while, by and large, the 
latter outperform the former (panel B). 
To test whether the above relationships 
can appear when controlling other factors 
simultaneously, we perform probit re-
gressions taking a discrete variable, which 
assigns a value of 1 to privatized firms or 
firms acquired by foreign investors in 
2003 as the dependent variable. As in-
dependent variables, we employ the 
natural logarithm of total assets for 2002 
to proxy for company size before pri-
vatization and a dummy variable, which 
takes a value of 1 for firms whose op-
erating income was negative for 2002, as 
well as the six performance indices which 
differed at the 10% or lower significance 
level between the groups compared in 
Table 4. We also use dummy variables to 
capture the fixed effects of firm locations 
in the western and eastern regions and a 
dummy variable with a value of one if the 
firms operating in traditional public 
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sectors 11  as control variables. 12  We es-
timate a regression model of the prob-
ability of being acquired by foreign in-
vestors using the two-step probit max-
imum likelihood estimator with the 
probability of privatization being the 
dependent variable at the first stage. Table 
5 presents the results of our regressions. 
The signs of the independent variables 
estimated with statistical significance at the 
10% or lower level correspond to the 
results of the univariate comparison shown 
in Table 4. These findings strongly suggest 
the presence of selection bias in the 
Hungarian government’s privatization 
decision as well as certain differences 
between domestic and foreign investors in 
terms of their behavior when purchasing 
state firms.13 
 
C. Panel Estimation of the Effects of          
Ownership Transformation 
 
In performing the panel estimation of the 
effects of ownership transformation, we 
take four measures to deal with the 
selection bias of privatization decision and 
acquisition by foreign investors. First, in 
our panel regressions, we do not use the 
level of firm performance, but, rather, the 
                                                        
11 These sectors refer to the mining of uranium and 
thorium ores (NACE12); electricity, gas, steam, and 
hot water supply (40); collection, purification, and 
distribution of water (41); transport via railways 
(60.1); post and courier activities (64.1); central 
banking (65.11); public administration and defense 
and compulsory social security (75); education (80), 
health and social work (85), and sewage and refuse 
disposal, sanitation, and similar activities (90). 
12 The largest correlation coefficient between these 
independent variables in all combinations, in-
cluding the 6 performance indices, is 0.41, well 
below the threshold of 0.70 for possible multi-
collinearity. 
13  Almost the same results were obtained by 
conducting the analyses reported in Tables 4 and 
5 while excluding all firms privatized in 2004 and 
onwards from the remaining SOEs as of 2003. 
rate of its annual change as the dependent 
variable for the 18 indices of profitability, 
productivity, financial ability, and 
soundness. Secondly, we control the level 
of the dependent variable in the previous 
year, since the past performance level may 
strongly affect the range of the growth rate 
of the relevant performance index as a 
result of management efforts for the 
current term. Thirdly, to control firm size, 
we use the natural logarithm of total assets 
as an independent variable. Fourthly, we 
exclude every sample falling outside the 
mean ± 2 standard deviations of all 
samples with respect to the level of the 
performance index for 2002 to be 
analyzed.14 
We performed regressions using the 
panel data on 411 firms from the 
agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing, 
the manufacturing, the construction, and 
the service sectors, which made up for 82% 
of the 499 SOEs listed in Table 3. We 
carried out a total of 4,140 estimation 
trials (i.e., 15 types of regression equations 
defined in Section 3×23 types of per-
formance indices ×3 types of panel es-
timators ×4 industrial sectors). 
Two-hundred and ninety-seven estimations 
of the Model V family were not successful 
due to the small sample size of the firms 
acquired by foreign investors or lack of 
data; hence, we did not adopt the cor-
responding estimates of the Model IV 
family for comparison of the two models 
on the same estimation basis. Consequently, 
we obtained a total of 3,546 estimates of 
ownership variables. The meta-analyses in 
the following two subsections use these 
3,546 estimates. With respect to the 
composition by the panel estimator of the 
                                                        
14 The actual number of outliers excluded by this 
criterion is less than 0.5% of all samples in all cases, 
suggesting the significant homogeneity of Hun-
garian SOEs in firm performance. 
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1,182 models selected by the Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan specification tests, 962, or 
81.4%, are pooled OLS estimators, 153, or 
12.9%, are random-effects estimators, and 
the remaining 67, or 5.7%, are 
fixed-effects estimators. These findings 
suggest that our panel regression model is 
well formulated in the sense that there is 
little need for distinguishing individual 
firm effects as fixed effects or random 
effects. 
 
D. Synthesis of Regression Coefficients 
 
Synthesis of regression coefficients is 
performed using the estimation results of 
the selected models according to the type 
of model family and the type of investor 
as well as by each of the three categories 
of performance index: the SOE-inferior, 
the SOE-superior, and the differ-
ence-insignificant. The results are detailed 
in Table 6. In addition to the synthesized 
values of regression coefficients based on 
the meta fixed-effects models and the meta 
random-effects models and the values of 
homogeneity tests, this table also presents 
the asymptotic z-values to test the 
null-hypothesis that the synthesized effect 
size is zero, the combined p-value obtained 
using the inverse Chi-square method and 
the inverse normal method, 15  and the 
results of the vote-counting method. 
If hypothesis H1 is true, we expect that 
the synthesized effect size of Model I 
family based on the SOE-inferior indices is 
                                                        
15 If p1, p2, …, pN are p-values of N estimates, the 
inverse Chi-square method uses the statistic: 
∑ =− Nn np1 )log(2 , which has a Chi-square distribution 
with 2N degree of freedom, and the inverse normal 
method uses the statistic: ∑ = −Φ⋅ Nn npN 1 1 )(1 , which 
has the normal distribution. )(⋅Φ represents the 
standard normal distribution function (Hedges 
1992).  
significantly positive due to the sources of 
privatization gains, whereas those based on 
the SOE-superior indices are negative. We 
also predict that it is more difficult to 
detect the positive effects of ownership 
transformation through meta-analyses 
based on the difference-insignificant in-
dices than through those based on the 
SOE-inferior indices. If hypothesis H2 is 
empirically supported, the synthesized 
effect size of Model II family whose scope 
of application is limited to the cases of 
transfer of strategic control rights should 
exceed those of the Model I family, which 
covers the ownership transformation 
effects without a lower limit, and further, 
the synthesized effect size of the Model III 
family, which tracks only the effects of full 
privatization, should be superior to those 
of the former two models. In addition, if 
hypothesis H3 is correct, the synthesized 
effect size of ownership transformation to 
foreign investors (Model V family) will 
surpass those of ownership transformation 
to domestic investors (Model IV family). 
The results shown in Table 6 strongly 
support the above predictions. With the 
exception of ownership transformation to 
domestic investors using the differ-
ence-insignificant indices, we refer to the 
synthesized effect sizes based on the meta 
random-effects model to verify the hy-
potheses because the null-hypothesis is 
rejected by the homogeneity test at the 5% 
or lower significance level. The synthesized 
effect size for the Model I family based on 
the SOE-inferior indices is positively es-
timated at the 1% level, whereas that based 
on the SOE-superior indices is negative at 
the 1% level and that based on the dif-
ference-insignificant indices is statistically 
insignificant. Similar results are also 
obtained when comparing the synthesized 
effect sizes of other models. By comparing 
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the results for the Model I, II, and III 
families, we confirm that the synthesized 
effect sizes of ownership transformation 
without a lower limit are always smaller 
than those of transfer of strategic control 
rights, and those of full privatization are 
always larger than those of partial 
privatization. Furthermore, the comparison 
of the synthesized effect sizes of the Model 
IV and Model V families indicates that the 
effects of ownership transformation to 
foreign investors are greatly superior to 
those to domestic investors except for the 
case of the SOE-superior indices. Although 
we do not go into detail here due to space 
limitations, the results from the p-value 
combination procedure and the 
vote-counting method also, by and large, 
support the conclusions derived from the 
meta-analysis of regression coefficients.16 
 
E. Meta-Regression Analysis 
 
Table 7 contains the definitions and 
descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the meta-regression analysis. The es-
timation results are presented in Table 8. 
Models [1] through [5] show the estimation 
results from the meta-regression models 
covering all panel estimates, and Models 
[6] through [10] show the estimation results 
using only the estimates of the selected 
models. 
The results strongly support hypothesis 
H1. In 7 of the 10 models, with the 
difference-insignificant indices as the 
default category, the dummy variables 
denoting that an SOE-inferior index is used 
as a dependent variable for the panel 
estimation have positive signs at the 10% 
                                                        
16  See Coggin and Hunter (1993) for how to 
interpret the results from the vote-counting 
method. 
or lower significance level, while the 
dummy variables designating the use of an 
SOE-superior index are significantly 
negative in 8 models. Similarly, hypothesis 
H3 is supported by the results in which the 
dummy variables identifying the panel 
estimates on the effects of ownership 
transformation to foreign investors are 
positively estimated in 9 models. On the 
other hand, although all of the dummy 
variables relating to the effects of transfer 
of strategic control rights and those of full 
privatization have positive signs excluding 
one case in Model [1], they are not 
statistically robust enough to be used as 
supporting evidence for hypothesis H2. 
The estimation results of other me-
ta-independent variables suggest the 
following four points with respect to the 
sensitivity of the panel estimation: 1) The 
effects of ownership transformation tend 
to wane over time. 2) No statistically robust 
differences are observed in the industrial 
sectors and the qualitative categories of the 
performance indices. 3) Although no 
apparent bias is seen in the overall es-
timation results arising from the dif-
ferences among panel estimators, the 
random-effects estimators in the selected 
models tend to be more biased downward 
than OLS and the fixed-effects estimators. 
4) The estimates of the selected models 
have no significant bias in comparison to 
those of the unselected models. The second 
point is particularly interesting from the 
viewpoint of policy implication. 
5) CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we empirically examined the 
effects of ownership transformation from 
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the state to the private sector on 
post-privatization firm performance fo-
cusing on the Hungarian enterprises in the 
early 2000s. We used annual census-type 
data compiled by the Hungarian National 
Tax Authority for the empirical analyses. 
Although this dataset presents an ample 
sample size in cross-section, it allowed us 
to trace the performance changes for up 
to two years after privatization. The short 
observation period is a serious obstacle to 
the detection of the privatization effects. 
We attempted to overcome this data 
constraint by combining the panel esti-
mation regressing various performance 
indices into the scale and type of own-
ership transformation with the me-
ta-analysis of the regression coefficients. 
This empirical methodology made it 
possible to wholly capture restructuring 
efforts of new owners and managers, 
leading to the successful detection of the 
statistically significant effects of ownership 
transformation. That is, the synthesis of 
regression coefficients of the ownership 
variables provided supporting evidence for 
all three testable hypotheses presented in 
Section I, and the results of the me-
ta-regression analysis verified hypotheses 
H1 and H3. 
The most important lesson from this 
research is that to detect the effects of 
ownership transformation, it is necessary 
to identify the potential sources of pri-
vatization gains. It was revealed that in 
Hungary at the beginning of the 21st 
Century, the performance gaps between 
public and private enterprises were more 
limited than had been anticipated. This fact 
in itself is considered to be on the positive 
side of the systemic transformation to a 
market economy in this country. Yet, if it 
is impossible to know in advance in what 
aspects SOEs are inferior to private firms 
in performance, we might have overlooked 
the effects of ownership transformation 
that actually existed. In fact, according to 
Table 6, the null-hypothesis that the 
synthesized effect size of the Model I 
family is zero cannot be rejected (z=0.01) 
when covering all performance indices. We 
expect that the feasibility of detecting the 
privatization effects will improve signif-
icantly if the potential source of priva-
tization gains can be identified beforehand. 
Another interesting finding in this paper 
is the fact that foreign investors out-
perform domestic investors in a short 
period of time with regard to medium and 
small-sized SOEs sold in the early 2000s, 
reminding us of the large-scale privati-
zation period when foreign direct in-
vestment made a critical contribution to 
the restructuring of large Hungarian 
corporations (Makó and Illéssy 2007). 
Moreover, according to the empirical 
results reported in the previous section, 
unlike in the 1990s, foreign investors 
bought and successfully restructured the 
public enterprises that had not been in 
good financial condition before privati-
zation. This constitutes counterevidence to 
the view that the effects of foreign 
participation in management of privatized 
firms are overestimated due to selection 
bias that drives foreign investors to select 
good companies for investment. If an 
appropriate policy framework is in place, 
there may be still plenty of room left for 
Hungary, the largest foreign capital re-
cipient among the former socialist 
countries, to be able to receive further 
benefits from foreign direct investment. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Private and State Corporate Sectors, 2002 
 
This table compares 98,367 private firms and 948 state-owned enteprises (SOEs) using annual census-type 
data for 2002 which were compiled from financial statements associated with tax reports submitted to 
the Hungarian National Tax Authority in Hungary by legal entities using double-sided bookkeeping. The 
western region consists of the following nine counties: Győr-Moson-Sopron; Komárom-Esztergom; Vas; 
Veszprém; Fejér; Zala; Somogy; Tolna; and Baranya.  The eastern region also consists of nine counties: 
Nógrád; Bács-Kiskun; Csongrád; Békés; Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok; Hajdú-Bihar; Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg; 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén; and Heves.  The composition by industrial sector is based on the Classification 
of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE). Other industries include public administration 
and defense and compulsory social security; education; health and social work; other community, social, 
and personal service activities; and household activities. 
 
  
A. Private 
firms B. SOEs 
Number of firms 98 367 948
Annual average number of employees (persons)
 Total 1 497 832 255 960
 Mean 15 270***
 Median 4 19†††
Equity capital 
 Total (billion HUFs) 4 360 1 592
 Mean (thousand HUFs) 44 325 1,679,550***
 Median (thousand HUFs) 3 000 60,864†††
Composition by region (actual number/proportion)a
 Capital region (Budapest and Pest County) 44 422 /0,45 392/0,41
 Western region 25 883 /0,26 254/0,27
 Eastern region 28 062 /0,29 302/0,32
Composition by industrial sector (actual number/proportion)b
 Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 4 095 /0,04 226/0,24
 Mining and quarrying 192 /0,00 3/0,00
 Manufacturing 17 490 /0,18 116/0,12
 Electricity, gas, and water supply 305 /0,00 30/0,03
 Construction 10 605 /0,11 80/0,08
 Wholesale and retail trade 30 255 /0,31 122/0,13
 Hotels and restaurants 4 780 /0,05 18/0,02
 Transport, storage, and communication 4 681 /0,05 56/0,06
 Financial intermediation 1 004 /0,01 30/0,03
 Real estate and renting 15 855 /0,16 175/0,18
 Other industries 9 105 /0,09 92/0,10
Share of state ownership (actual number/proportion)
1-25% - 147/0,16
26-50% - 101/0,11
51-75% - 83/0,09
76-99% - 118/0,12
100% - 499/0,53
a Test for equality: χ2=6.7446, p=0.034. 
b Test for equality: χ2=1246.8518, p=0.000. 
*** denotes that the difference between privave firms and SOEs is significant at the 1% level by the t-test. 
††† denotes that the difference between private firms and SOEs is significant at the 1% level by the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. 
 
 
 Table 2 
Firm Performance Comparison of Private and Fully State-Owned Enterprises, 2002 
 
This table presents the results of a univariate firm performance comparison of approximately 90,000 private and 499 fully state-owned enterprises (SOEs) using 
annual census-type data of Hungarian firms available for 2002 and 2003 in terms of 23 financial and operating performance indices. The 23 indices consist 
of five groups: profitability; productivity; financial ability; financial soundness; and firm growth. The following indices are defined as follows: fixed investment 
efficiency = value-added / total fixed assets; total (fixed) assets turnover = sales / total assets (fixed assets); and fixed ratio = total fixed assets / equity capital.  
All nominal values are deflated with the base year being 2002 using the consumer price index, the industrial producer price index, and the investment price 
index reported by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office as deflators when we compute the firm growth indices. The service sector includes wholesale and 
retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage, and communications; and real estate and renting. The SOE-inferior (SOE-superior) indices denote the financial 
and operating performance indices in which the mean or median for fully SOEs regarding the relevant indices are inferior (superior) to those for private firms 
with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. The difference-insignificant indices refer to those that do not satisfy these conditions. 
 
 
 
A. Whole corporate 
sector 
B. Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting, and fishing C. Manufacturing D. Construction E. Services 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
 
Profitability    
Ordinary income to total  Mean -0,311 -0,334 -0,170 -0,467 -0,230 0,020 -0,502 -0,104 -0,305 -0,491 
assets (ROI) Median ? 0,016 0,002 ††† ? 0,029 0,008 † 0,029 0,043 0,025 0,010 ? 0,010 -0,005 ††† 
Value-added to sales Mean ? 0,018 -0,239 *** -0,135 0,229 0,116 0,154 ? 0,112 -0,308 ** 0,003 -0,155 
 Median 0,198 0,222 ▼ 0,152 0,318 ††† 0,255 0,305 ? 0,190 0,140 †† 0,168 0,183  
Operating income to sales Mean -0,344 -0,679 -0,339 0,024 ? -0,287 -1,662 ** -0,253 -0,157 -0,372 -0,793 
 Median 0,016 0,015 0,032 0,017 0,020 0,029 0,014 0,017 0,014 0,009  
Ordinary income to sales Mean ? -0,419 -1,213 *** -0,390 0,035 ? -0,303 -1,159 * -0,271 -0,210 ? -0,446 -1,136 *** 
Median ? 0,017 0,007 ††† ? 0,045 0,015 †† 0,023 0,029 0,016 0,011 ? 0,014 0,002 ††† 
Return on equity capital  Mean 6,123 1,938 5,338 1,449 5,033 13,228 2,917 -1,029 4,249 2,522 
(ROE) Median ? 0,089 0,034 †† 0,108 0,036 0,122 0,104 0,099 0,025 0,051 0,024 
Return on total assets (ROA) Mean -0,390 -0,262 -0,222 -0,457 -0,339 0,011 -0,683 -0,085 -0,392 -0,394 
Median ? 0,019 0,009 †† 0,020 0,016 0,024 0,037 0,019 0,009 0,012 0,007 
Ordinary income on equity  Mean 2,167 1,065 2,487 1,384 ▼ 2,062 12,062 *** 0,808 -1,410 1,842 1,273 
capital Median ? 0,054 0,003 ††† ? 0,124 0,027 † 0,120 0,127 ? 0,100 0,015 †† ? 0,032 -0,010 ††† 
 
 
  
A. Whole corporate 
sector 
B. Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting, and fishing C. Manufacturing D. Construction E. Services 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
 
Productivity 
Value -added per employeea Mean ? 2287 1233 *** 1375 1660 2232 2541 ? 1784 867 ** ? 2389 1215 *** 
 Median 1327 1426 ▼ 1107 1670 †† 1451 2147 ? 1215 1046 †† 1318 1354  
Operating income per Mean ? 590 -392 *** 525 -84 467 1099 340 580 ? 643 -1209 *** 
employeea Median 86 86 196 90 85 241 62 137 69 52 
Ordinary income per Mean ? 540 -483 *** 658 -213 490 1010 393 94 ? 610 -763 *** 
employeea Median ? 105 29 ††† ? 328 66 ††† 128 75 101 91 ? 90 1 ††† 
Sales per employeea Mean ? 14681 12636 * ? 13852 7643 * 11502 12540 12420 12616 16673 14386 
 Median ? 6088 5597 † ? 7123 5792 † 5721 6822 ? 5969 4344 † 6727 5903  
Sales to employment Mean 42,421 25,271 49,282 14,788 27,692 7,394 37,611 11,280 46,587 35,686 
 Median ? 6,780 3,325 ††† ? 7,370 3,176 ††† ? 5,345 3,410 ††† ? 6,878 2,614 ††† ? 7,746 4,278 ††† 
Sales to total costs Mean ? 1,133 1,003 *** 1,066 1,007 ? 1,088 0,997 * ? 1,079 0,838 *** ? 1,130 1,049 *** 
Median ? 1,051 1,018 ††† 1,014 0,998 1,063 1,054 ? 1,046 0,935 ††† ? 1,045 1,026 ††† 
Fixed investment efficiency Mean ? 2,576 1,446 ** 0,649 0,065 2,698 3,471 ? 3,269 0,819 ** ? 2,748 1,423 * 
  Median ? 0,932 0,592 ††† ▼ 0,309 0,536 ††  1,191 1,347 ? 1,444 0,119 ††† ? 0,893 0,775 † 
Financial ability 
Total assets turnover Mean 3,622 3,236 2,348 2,868 2,851 2,236 5,756 5,312 3,609 3,425 
 Median ? 1,545 1,127 ††† 0,871 0,891 1,593 1,393 ? 2,044 0,788 ††† ? 1,558 1,235 † 
Fixed assets turnover Mean ? 15,362 8,237 *** 5,115 2,485 10,848 11,329 ? 17,487 3,043 *** 19,405 12,223 
 Median ? 4,610 1,946 ††† 2,159 1,880 4,456 4,648 ? 7,397 0,615 ††† ? 5,529 2,008 ††† 
Financial soundness 
Fixed ratio Mean ? 19,426 7,997 ** 18,796 2,742 15,334 1,846 15,528 1,198 21,692 17,203 
 Median ? 2,485 1,328 ††† ? 2,781 1,802 †† ? 2,502 0,879 ††† ? 2,485 1,185 ††† 2,509 1,730  
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Mean ▼ 0,184 0,281 *** ▼ 0,189 0,318 *** ▼ 0,184 0,282 *** ▼ 0,177 0,419 *** ▼ 0,190 0,245 *** 
 Median ▼ 0,092 0,231 ††† ▼ 0,103 0,283 ††† ▼ 0,100 0,242 ††† ▼ 0,088 0,448 ††† ▼ 0,097 0,178 ††† 
Firm growthb 
Sales growth Mean 2,040 0,902 1,079 0,011 1,397 -0,030 2,157 -0,233 2,174 2,321 
 Median ? 0,051 0,002 ††† -0,022 0,025 0,021 -0,005 ? 0,058 -0,239 ††† 0,051 0,024  
Value-added growth Mean ? 1,488 -1,244 *** 0,910 -0,011 1,174 -1,074 ? 2,053 -4,155 *** ? 1,500 -0,980 * 
 Median ? 0,063 -0,034 ††† -0,035 -0,001 ? 0,032 -0,034 † ? 0,038 -0,432 ††† 0,063 0,052  
  
A. Whole corporate 
sector 
B. Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting, and fishing C. Manufacturing D. Construction E. Services 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Private 
firms 
Fully SOEs 
 
Operating income growth Mean 0,190 -0,815 -0,154 0,240 ? 0,223 -9,835 * 0,248 -0,636 0,052 -4,972 
Median 0,023 0,044 ▼ -0,192 0,085 † 0,010 -0,285 -0,033 -0,282 0,030 0,046 
Ordinary income growth Mean 0,121 -0,420 -0,078 0,456 0,276 -4,568 0,232 -0,548 -0,037 0,520 
 Median 0,038 -0,055 ▼ -0,166 -0,041 † ? 0,025 -0,451 †† -0,046 -0,103 0,054 0,195  
Total assets growth Mean 1,292 0,116 1,021 0,034 0,844 0,085 1,722 0,051 1,290 0,104 
  Median 0,021 0,007 0,008 0,028  0,026 0,004 0,040 0,071 ? 0,009 -0,015 † 
 
Classification of performance indices 
(actual number/proportion) 
SOE-inferior indices (?) 18/0,78 7/0,30 8/0,35 12/0,52 13/0,57  
SOE-superior indices (▼) 1/0,04 6/0,26 2/0,09 1/0,04 1/0,04  
Difference-insignificant indices (no sign) 4/0,17 10/0,43
 
  13/0,57 10/0,43 9/0,39   
a The unit is one thousand HUFs. 
b Real growth rate for 2002-03 
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, by the t-test. 
†††, ††, † Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
? denotes that private firms are superior to full SOEs with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. 
▼ denotes that private firms are inferior to full SOEs with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. 
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Table 3 
Privatization Process of State-Owned Enterprises, 2002–2005 
 
This table traces the privatization process of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2002 through 2005 
using annual census-type data of Hungarian firms. The western region consists of the following nine 
counties: Győr-Moson-Sopron; Komárom-Esztergom; Vas; Veszprém; Fejér; Zala; Somogy; Tolna; and 
Baranya. The eastern region also consists of nine counties: Nógrád; Bács-Kiskun; Csongrád; Békés; 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok; Hajdú-Bihar; Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg; Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén; and Heves.  The 
composition by industrial sector is based on the Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community (NACE). Other industries include public administration and defense and compulsory social 
security; education; health and social work; other community, social, and personal service activities; and 
household activities. 
 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of fully SOEs 499  223  203  186  
Number of privatized firms 0  276  23  18  
Number of firms acquired by domestic investors 0  262  21  17  
Number of firms acquired by foreign investors 0  20  3  1  
Number of firms that experienced 
privatization twice 0  0  3  1  
Accumulated number of privatized firms 0  276  296  313  
Scale of ownership transformation 
All privatized firms Mean  - 0,99  0,84  0,82  
 Median - 1,00  1,00   1,00  
Firms acquired by domestic  Mean  - 0,98  0,81  0,81  
investors Median - 1,00  1,00   1,00  
Firms acquired by foreign Mean  - 0,80  0,83  1,00  
investors Median - 1,00  1,00   1,00  
 
Frequency distribution of the scale of ownership transformation (actual number/proportion) 
 1-10%  - 0/0,00 2/0,09 2 /0,11
11-25%  - 2/0,01 0/0,00 1 /0,06
26-50%  - 1/0,00 1/0,04 0 /0,00
51-75%  - 1/0,00 2/0,09 2 /0,11
76-99%  - 0/0,00 4/0,17 1 /0,06
100%  - 272/0,99 14/0,61 12 /0,67
 
Composition of privatized firms by region (actual number/proportion)a
 Capital region (Budapest and Pest County) 287/0,58 160/0,58 11/0,48 10 /0,56
 Western region 95/0,19 55/0,20 9/0,39 1 /0,06
 Eastern region 117/0,23 61/0,22 3/0,13 7 /0,39
 
Composition of privatized firms by industrial sector (actual number/proportion)a 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 43/0,09 12/0,04 1/0,04 2 /0,11
Mining and quarrying 3/0,01 0/0,00 0/0,00 1 /0,06
Manufacturing 63/0,13 32/0,12 4/0,17 4 /0,22
Electricity, gas, and water supply 5/0,01 1/0,00 0/0,00 1 /0,06
Construction 72/0,14 29/0,11 3/0,13 2 /0,11
Wholesale and retail trade 86/0,17 79/0,29 4/0,17 0 /0,00
Hotels and restaurants 16/0,03 16/0,06 0/0,00 0 /0,00
Transport, storage, and communications 19/0,04 11/0,04 0/0,00 1 /0,06
Financial intermediation 11/0,02 3/0,01 1/0,04 0 /0,00
Real estate and renting 112/0,22 63/0,23 7/0,30 7 /0,39
Other industries   69/0,14 30/0,11 3/0,13 0 /0,00
a The data for 2002 are the breakdown of state enterprises. 
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Table 4 
Comparison between Privatized Firms and Remaining State-Owned Enterprises and between Firms 
Acquired by Domestic Investors and Those Acquired by Foreign Investors 
 
This table presents the results of a univariate comparison of firms privatized in 2003 and remaining 
state-owned  enterprises (SOEs) and  firms acquired by domestic investors and those acquired by foreign 
investors as a result of the enterprise privatization conducted in 2003 in terms of pre-privatization company 
size and firm performance in 2002. The purpose is to identify the presence and extent of selection bias 
regarding the privatization decision of the Hungarian government and the acquisition of privatized firms 
by foreign investors in comparison with those by domestic investors. We use annual census-type data 
of Hungarian firms for 2002 and 2003. The sample is the same as that in Table 3. 
 
 
A. Comparison of privatized 
firms and remaining SOEs
B. Comparison of firms 
acquired by domestic 
investors and those acquired 
by foreign investors
Privatized 
firms
SOEs Domestic 
investors 
Foreign 
investors
Company size 
Total number of employees  Mean ▼ 16,558 677,833 ▼ 14,863 46,909
(persons) Median ▼ 3 61 ††† 3 5
Total salesa Mean ▼ 143304 3420213 138589 226004
 Median ▼ 18917 355055 ††† 18652 36188
Total asseta Mean ▼ 167591 11000000 ▼ 129251 658348
 Median ▼ 10093 569656 ††† ▼ 9322 27826 †††
Profitability 
Ordinary income to total assets  Mean ▼ -0,319 -0,019 -0,338 -0,084
(ROI) Median 0,002 0,004 0,010 -0,050
Value-added to sales Mean ? 0,050 -5,356 0,029 0,416
 Median 0,173 0,274 ▼ 0,165 0,356 †
Operating income to sales Mean -0,450 -20,561 -0,467 -0,155
 Median 0,017 0,016 0,017 0,018
Ordinary income to sales Mean -0,472 -20,682 -0,484 -0,260
Median 0,009 0,008 0,010 -0,006
Return on equity capital (ROE) Mean 7,148 0,410 7,677 0,625
Median 0,096 0,027 ? 0,120 -0,087 †
Return on total assets (ROA) Mean ▼ -0,145 -0,003 -0,152 -0,055
Median 0,017 0,009 ? 0,024 -0,019 ††
Ordinary income on equity  Mean 3,801 0,219 5,029 -11,300
capital Median 0,014 0,011 ? 0,029 -0,213 †
Productivity 
Value-added per employeea Mean 3197 285 3166 3774
 Median 1417 1629 1417 986
Operating income per  Mean -902 -5952 -987 636
employeea Median 109 92 116 39
Ordinary income per  Mean ? 846 -5244 * 1027 -2390
employeea Median 43 31 ? 50 -504 †
Sales per employeea Mean ? 17152 10376 17063 18841
 Median ? 6963 5571 †† 6999 4031
Sales to employment Mean ? 48,086 10,622 50,422 7,025
 Median ? 6,706 2,204 ††† ? 6,864 2,550 ††
Sales to total costs Mean ? 1,149 0,872 ▼ 1,110 1,823
Median ? 1,032 0,961 ††† 1,035 1,017
Fixed investment efficiency Mean 1,435 -1,282 1,505 0,295
 Median ? 0,825 0,372 †† 0,947 0,024
Financial ability 
Total assets turnover Mean ? 4,494 1,023 4,679 1,251
 Median ? 1,778 0,773 ††† ? 1,847 0,318 †††
Fixed assets turnover Mean ? 10,200 4,361 10,773 0,849
 Median ? 4,894 1,539 ††† ? 5,714 0,127 ††
Financial soundness 
Fixed ratio Mean ? 11,550 2,815 12,074 6,412
 Median ? 1,951 1,266 ††† 1,800 6,909
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Mean ▼ 0,273 0,368 0,269 0,330
  Median ▼ 0,167 0,309 ††† 0,163 0,292
a The unit is thousand HUFs. ***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, by the t-test. 
†††, ††, † Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
? denotes that privatized firms (those acquired by domestic investors) are superior to SOEs 
(those acquired by foreign investors) with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. 
▼ denotes that privatized firms (those acquired by domestic investors) are inferior to SOEs 
(those acquired by foreign investors) with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. 
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis of Privatization Decision and Acquisition of Privatized Firms by Foreign 
Investors 
 
This table presents the results of regression analyses on the presence and extent of selection bias regarding 
the privatization decisions made by the Hungarian government and the acquisition of privatized firms 
by foreign investors in comparison with that by domestic investors. Models [1] to [3] take the probability 
of privatization as a dependent variable and are estimated using a probit maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimator. Models [4] to [6] take the probability of privatization and the probability of being acquired 
by foreign investors as dependent variables of the first and second stage of regression, respectively.  We 
estimated  models [4] to [6] using the two-step probit ML estimator.  As independent variables, we employ 
the natural logarithm of total assets for 2002 to proxy for company size before privatization and a 
dummy variable, which takes one for the firms whose operating income was negative for 2002 as well 
as the six performance indices that differed at the 10% or lower significance level among the groups 
compared in Table IV. We also use dummy variables to control the fixed effects of the firm locations 
in the western and eastern regions and a dummy variable with a value of one if the firms were operating 
in traditional public sectors. The t-values are reported in parentheses beneath the regression coefficients. 
The Wald test tests the null-hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero. All SOE samples used for 
the estimation of regression models are the same in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Dependent variable A. Probability of privatization B. Probability of being acquired by foreign investors 
Estimator Probit ML Two-step probit ML 
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Pre-privatization company size 
Total assets (natural logarithm) -0,409 *** -0,470 *** -0,476
**
* 0,334 ** 0,420 
**
* 3,817 *
 (-9,55) (-10,54) (-5,88) (2,00) (5,22)  (1,78)
Pre-privatization firm performance 
Firms with negative operating  -0,344 * 0,796 
**
* 
income (-1,87) (2,87)  
Value-added to sales 0,082 3,787 **
 (0,73)   (2,10)
Return on total assets (ROA) -1,409 -8,301 **
 (-1,21)   (-2,21)
Ordinary income per employee 
0,000
1 *
-0,000
2
 (1,77)   (-1,00)
Sales to total costs 0,594 * -7,655 ***
 (1,85)   (-2,84)
Total assets turnover 0,274 * -3,208 **
 (1,95)   (-2,07
)
Fixed ratio 0,056 ** -0,340
 (2,19)   (-1,37)
Location 
Western region -0,032 -0,118 -0,202 0,312 0,320 0,004
 (-0,18) (-0,63) (-0,62
)
(0,95) (1,22)  (0,08)
Eastern region 0,051 -0,034 0,209 -0,194 -0,220 -1,765
 (0,30) (-0,19) (0,78) (-0,72) (-0,83)  (-1,42)
Industrial sectors   
Traditional public sectors -1,036 *** -1,009 *** -0,838 * 0,449 0,601 -0,177 **
 (-5,05) (-5,12) (-1,85) (0,51) (1,18)  (-2,27)
Const. 4,866 *** 5,738 *** 4,348
**
* 0,000 -5,503 
**
* 0,682 *
  (9,66) (10,93) (4,68) (0,00) (-8,44)   (1,88)
N 499 477 196 499 477 196
N (The second stage) - - - 223 210 124
Pseudo R2 0,41 0,44 0,40 - - -
Log likelihood -203,60 -183,92 -65,09 -269,30 -244,58 -7,26
Wald test 126,93 *** 124,08 *** 57,94
**
* 17,09
**
* 48,85 
**
* 24,70 ***
 
 
 
 
 Table 6 
Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Ownership Transformation on Firm Performance 
 
This table presents the results of the synthesis of the regression coefficients (effect sizes) of ownership variables estimated by the panel data regression analysis 
conducted as the third stage of our empirical analysis. Also presented are the results of supplemental analyses using the p-value combination method and the 
vote-counting method - more traditional meta-analysis techniques. See Section 3 for details of the meta-analysis methods. Here, we employ the estimates of regression 
models selected according to the Hausman test and the Breusch-Pagan test. The critical value for both of these specification tests is set at the 10% level. We 
verify the testable hypothesis presented in Section I based on the value of synthesized regression coefficients and its statistical significance adopting either the 
meta fixed-effects model or the meta random-effects model according to the results of the homogeneity test. The SOE-inferior (SOE-superior) indices denote the 
financial and operating performance indices, in which the means or medians for fully SOEs regarding the relevant indices in Table 2 are inferior (superior) 
to those for private firms with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. The difference-insignificant indices refer to those indices that do not satisfy these 
conditions. 
 
 
 
Synthesis of regression coefficients p-value combination method Vote-counting method 
N Meta fi-
xed-effects 
(asymptotic 
z-value)a 
Meta ran-
dom-effects 
(asymptotic 
z-value)a 
Homogeneity 
test  
Inverse 
Chi-square 
method 
Inverse 
normal 
method 
Proportion 
of positive to 
negative 
estimates 
Number of 
positively 
significant 
estimates
Number of 
negatively 
significant 
estimates
(z-value) b (one-sided 
z-value) c 
(one-sided 
z-value) c 
A. All performance indices 
Ownership transformation without a lower limit -0.000 0,000 1459,143
***
710,656
***
5,801
***
172/107
***
33/276 24/276 276 
(Model I family) (-0,23) (0,01) (4,09) (1,08) (-0,72)  
Transfer of strategic control rights family) -0,001 0,002 1490,377
***
710,000
***
5,803
***
171/105
***
33/276 23/276 276 
(Model II (-0,58) (0,02)  (3,97) (1,08) (-0,92)  
Full privatization (Model III family) -0,004
*
0,052
***
1682,125
***
746,838
***
5,854
***
177/99
***
36/276
**
16/276 276 
(-1,68) (2,92) (4,70) (1,69) (-2,33)  
Ownership transformation to domestic investors -0.000 -0,005 294,200
***
489,676
***
4,707
***
110/67
***
19/177 9/177 177 
(Model IV family) (-0,76) (-0,90) (3,23) (0,33) (-2,18)  
Ownership transformation to foreign investors -0,041
*
0,274
***
699,528
***
444,988
***
4,694
***
107/70
***
28/177
***
11/177 177 
(Model V family) (-1,89) (3,75) (2,78) (2,58) (-1,68)  
B. SOE-inferior indices 
Ownership transformation without a lower limit 0,005
**
0,069
***
551,471
***
312,164
***
3,861
***
77/43
***
16/120 6/120 120 
(Model I family) (2,08) (4,41) (3,10) (1,22) (-1,83)  
Transfer of strategic control rights  0,009
***
0,078
***
530,535
***
313,094
***
3,867
***
77/43
***
16/120 5/120 120 
(Model II family) (3,72) (4,34) (3,10) (1,22) (-2,13)  
Full privatization (Model III family) 0,013
***
0,117
***
499,806
***
311,135
***
3,897
***
80/40
***
13/120 3/120 120 
(4,08) (4,99) (3,65) (0,30) (-2,74)  
Ownership transformation to domestic investors -0.000 0,040
**
105,037
**
204,332
***
3,067
***
47/29
**
7/76 3/76 76 
(Model IV family) (-0,76) (2,20) (2,06) (-0,23) (-1,76)  
  
Synthesis of regression coefficients p-value combination method Vote-counting method 
N Meta fi-
xed-effects 
(asymptotic 
z-value)a 
Meta ran-
dom-effects 
(asymptotic 
z-value)a 
Homogeneity 
test  
Inverse 
Chi-square 
method 
Inverse 
normal 
method 
Proportion 
of positive to 
negative 
estimates 
Number of 
positively 
significant 
estimates
Number of 
negatively 
significant 
estimates
(z-value) b (one-sided 
z-value) c 
(one-sided 
z-value) c 
Ownership transformation to foreign investors -0,021 0,466
***
313,841
***
220,249
***
3,096
***
49/27
**
14/76
***
6/76 76 
(Model V family) (-0,60) (3,93) (2,52) (2,45) (-0,61)    
C. SOE-superior indices 
Ownership transformation without a lower limit -0,036
***
-0,105
***
282,294
***
57,344 1,744
*
13/17 3/30 9/30
***
30 
(Model I family) (-5,67) (-3,03) (-0,73) (0,00) (3,65)   
Transfer of strategic control rights  -0,045
***
-0,089
***
312,985
***
57,463 1,745
*
13/17 3/30 9/30
***
30 
(Model II family) (-7,32) (-2,57) (-0,73) (0,00) (3,65)  
Full privatization (Model III family) -0,069
***
-0,041 539,425
***
68,870 1,772
*
13/17 5/30 9/30
***
30 
(-12,20) (-1,06) (-0,73) (1,22) (3,65)  
Ownership transformation to domestic investors -0,001 -0,032
***
79,697
***
28,087 1,094 5/7 1/12 6/12
***
12 
(Model IV family) (-0,46) (-2,82) (-0,58) (-0,19) (4,62)  
Ownership transformation to foreign investors  -0,041 -0,044 18,374
*
19,662 1,125 5/7 1/12 2/12 12 
(Model V family) (-1,21) (-0,82) (-0,58) (-0,19) (0,77)  
D. Difference-insignificant indices 
Ownership transformation without a lower limit -0,018 -0,044 586,949
***
341,148
***
3,967
***
82/44
***
14/126 9/126 126 
(Model I family) (-1,42) (-0,82) (3,39) (0,42) (-1,07)  
Transfer of strategic control rights  -0,009 -0,038 579,511
***
339,442
***
3,962
***
81/45
***
14/126 9/126 126 
(Model II family) (-0,56) (-0,61) (3,21) (0,42) (-1,07)  
Full privatization (Model III family) 0,018
*
0,073 476,781
***
366,833
***
3,996
***
84/42
***
18/126
**
4/126 126 
(1,88) (1,35) (3,74) (1,60) (-2,55)  
Ownership transformation to domestic investors 0,043
***
0,148
***
102,168 257,257
***
3,403
***
58/31
***
11/89 0/89 89 
(Model IV family) (2,66) (3,42) (2,86) (0,74) (-3,14)  
Ownership transformation to foreign investors  -0,087
*
0,395
**
366,141
***
205,077
**
3,346
***
53/36
*
13/89
*
3/89 89 
(Model V family)  (-1,71) (2,36)   (1,80) (1,45) (-2,08)   
a Null-hypothesis: The synthesized effect size is zero. 
b Null-hypothesis: The proportion of positive to negative estimates is 50/50. 
c Null-hypothesis: The proportion of estimates with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level is less than 10%. 
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Table 7 
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Meta-Regression Analysis 
 
This table contains the details of the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the meta-regression analysis, the estimation results from which 
are reported in Table 8. The SOE-inferior (SOE-superior) indices denote the financial and operating performance indices, in which the means or medians for 
full SOEs regarding the relevant indices in Table 2 are inferior (superior) to those for private firms with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. The 
elements of each of the four index groups correspond with those in Table 2. CV and BD denote a continuous variable and a binary dummy variable, respectively. 
S.D. denotes the standard deviation. 
 
Variable name Definition Mean S. D. Median 
Effects of ownership transformation 
(dependent variable) CV: Regression coefficients of ownership variables (effect sizes) 0,451 7,748 0,161 
SOE-inferior indices BD: 1 = if an SOE-inferior index is used as a dependent variable 0,433 0,496 0 
SOE-superior indices BD: 1 = if an SOE-superior index is used as a dependent variable 0,096 0,295 0 
Transfer of strategic control rights  BD: 1 = An estimate of the effects of 50% or higher ownership transformation 0,234 0,423 0 
Full privatization BD: 1 = An estimate of the effects of full privatization 0,234 0,423 0 
Ownership transformation to domestic 
investors BD: 1 = An estimate of the effects of ownership transformation to domestic investors 0,150 0,357 0 
Ownership transformation to foreign 
investors  BD: 1 = An estimate of the effects of ownership transformation to foreign investors 0,150 0,357 0 
One-year lag BD: 1 = An estimate of the one-year lag effects of ownership transformation 0,335 0,472 0 
Two-year lag BD: 1 = An estimate of the two-year lag effects of ownership transformation 0,330 0,470 0 
Manufacturing  BD: 1 = if samples are manufacturing enterprises 0,292 0,455 0 
Construction BD: 1 = if samples are construction enterprises 0,246 0,431 0 
Services BD: 1 = if samples are service enterprises 0,287 0,452 0 
Productivity index group BD: 1 = if a productivity index is used as a dependent variable 0,283 0,450 0 
Financial ability index group BD: 1 = if a financial ability index is used as a dependent variable 0,085 0,278 0 
Financial soundness index group BD: 1 = if a financial soundness index is used as a dependent variable 0,085 0,278 0 
Firm growth index group BD: 1 = if a firm growth index is used as a dependent variable 0,228 0,420 0 
Fixed-effects estimator BD: 1 = if a fixed-effects estimator is used 0,333 0,471 0 
Random-effects estimator BD: 1 = if a random-effects estimator is used 0,333 0,471 0 
Selected models BD: 1 = An estimate obtained from regression models selected by the model specification tests 0,333 0,471 0 
Number of observations CV: A natural logarithm of the number of observations used in a panel estimation 5,352 0,647 5,142 
 
 
 Table 8 
Meta-Regression Analysis 
 
This table presents the estimation results of meta-regression models that take the effects of ownership transformation on post-privatization firm performance 
estimated by panel regression analyses conducted as the third stage of the empirical analysis as dependent variables. The dependent variable is regressed into 
meta-independent variables having the characteristics of the regression model and observations that are considered to create differences in panel estimation results. 
To estimate the meta-regression models, we use five estimators for a robustness check: (1) weighted least square (WLS) estimator with number of observations 
as analytical weights; (2) WLS estimator with standard errors as analytical weights; (3) meta random-effects estimator using the restricted maximum likelihood 
method (RML); (4) meta random-effects estimator using the non-iterative moment method (MM); (5) meta mixed-effects estimator using the RML method. Models 
[1] through [5] are the estimation results from the meta-regression models covering all panel estimates, and Models [6] through [10] are the estimation results 
using only the estimates of the selected models according to the model specification tests. The meta mixed-effects models assume heterogeneity between different 
performance indices. The definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations are listed in Table 7. The F-test and the Wald test test 
the null-hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero. 
 
Dependent variable Effects of ownership transformation (all models) Effects of ownership tranformation (selected models) 
Estimator WLS    [N] 
WLS    
[s.e.] 
Random 
effects  
RML
Random 
effects  
MM
Mixed effects 
RML 
WLS   
[N] 
WLS   
[s.e.] 
Random 
effects  
RML
Random 
effects  
MM
Mixed 
effects  
RML 
Independent variable (default 
category)/model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Effects of ownership transformation in 2,527
***
17,837 0,149
***
0,178
**
0,123 2,255
**
11,130 0,047 0,061 4,065
default conditions (intercept) (3,45) (1,36) (4,70) (2,09) (0,03) (2,44) (0,39) (0,47) (0,36) (0,60) 
Performance differences (difference-insignificant indices) 
 
SOE-inferior indices 0,144 0,056 0,010
***
0,046
***
1,481
***
0,707
*
2,430
***
0,038
***
0,065
***
0,675
(0,54) (0,11) (2,89) (4,42) (4,73) (1,67) (3,22) (3,46) (2,96) (1,33) 
SOE-superior indices -0,399 -5,192
**
-0,137
***
-0,149
***
-1,087
*
-0,759
*
-2,259
*
-0,324
***
-0,192
***
-0,946
(-0,60) (-2,49) (-8,84) (-9,21) (-1,66) (-1,71) (-1,82) (-9,81) (-6,23) (-0,90) 
Scale of ownership transformation (privatization without lower limit) 
Transfer of strategic control rights -0,009 1,209
*
0,008
***
0,005 0,015 0,005 0,030 0,001 0,001 0,007
(-0,02) (1,75) (3,91) (0,47) (0,04) (0,01) (0,03) (0,34) (0,03) (0,01) 
Full privatization 0,051 0,425 0,006
**
0,021
**
0,137 0,093 0,792 0,006 0,044
**
0,184
(0,14) (0,61) (2,54) (2,12) (0,37) (0,16) (0,78) (1,59) (2,11) (0,31) 
Types of ownership transformation (no classification) 
 
Ownership transformation to domestic -0,229 -0,475 -0,015
***
0,013 -0,079 -0,449 -2,843
**
-0,001 0,008 -0,221
investors (-0,59) (-0,61) (-7,45) (1,07) (-0,19) (-0,72) (-2,47) (-0,33) (0,31) (-0,32) 
Ownership transformation to foreign 1,700
***
2,153
***
0,063
***
0,054
***
1,379
***
2,622
***
7,991
***
0,006 0,006
**
2,390
*** 
investors (4,35) (2,64) (3,81) (2,62) (3,25) (4,19) (6,03) (0,25) (2,18) (3,48) 
 
 
          
 Dependent variable Effects of ownership transformation (all models) Effects of ownership tranformation (selected models) 
Estimator WLS    [N] 
WLS    
[s.e.] 
Random 
effects  
RML
Random 
effects  
MM
Mixed effects 
RML 
WLS   
[N] 
WLS   
[s.e.] 
Random 
effects  
RML
Random 
effects  
MM
Mixed 
effects  
RML 
Independent variable (default 
category)/model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Time-lag effects (no lag)
One-year lag -1,860
***
-3,292
***
-0,007
***
-0,075
***
-0,811
***
-1,658
***
-1,760 -0,007
**
-0,121
***
-0,711
(-6,33) (-5,05) (-3,40) (-8,17) (-2,66) (-3,52) (-1,49) (-2,01) (-6,51) (-1,44) 
Two-year lag -3,178
***
-14,771
***
0,004
*
-0,021
**
-2,890
***
-2,500
***
-12,784
***
-0,006
**
-0,026 -2,564
*** 
(-6,78) (-8,07) (1,69) (-2,25) (-9,44) (-5,30) (-4,99) (-2,16) (-1,34) (-5,17) 
Industrial sector (agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing) 
Manufacturing 0,457 5,154
***
-0,034
***
-0,021
*
0,627 0,361 4,841
*
0,066
***
0,102
***
0,111
(0,82) (3,24) (-4,08) (-1,80) (1,33) (0,40) (1,84) (6,68) (4,00) (0,14) 
Construction -1,185
**
0,021 -0,059
***
-0,091
***
-1,242
**
-0,439 -5,696
*
0,034
***
0,026 -0,692
(-2,13) (0,01) (-7,94) (-6,32) (-2,20) (-0,49) (-1,65) (2,66) (0,90) (-0,77) 
Services -0,215 9,142
**
-0,070
***
-0,023 -0,708 0,257 -8,633 0,067
**
0,107
*
-1,310
  (-0,43) (1,96) (-6,76) (-0,83) (-0,48) (0,32) (-0,86) (2,01) (1,89) (-0,57)  
Independent variable (default 
category)/model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Performance index group (profitability index group) 
Productivity index group -0,232 -3,159
***
0,028
***
0,010 -0,691 -0,278 1,329 -0,030
***
0,035 -0,300
(-0,72) (-4,01) (4,84) (0,54) (-0,60) (-0,54) (0,96) (-3,40) (1,15) (-0,25) 
Financial ability index group -0,746 -3,017 0,010 -0,103
***
-0,930 -0,991 0,529 -0,107
***
-0,083
**
-0,568
(-1,46) (-1,03) (1,55) (-5,08) (-0,54) (-1,21) (0,12) (-6,82) (-2,33) (-0,31) 
Financial soundness index group -0,512 -5,105 0,104
***
0,067
***
-1,174 -0,718 -3,024 0,142
***
0,085
**
-1,023
(-0,75) (-0,98) (13,09) (3,27) (-0,67) (-0,63) (-0,34) (10,16) (2,27) (-0,53) 
Firm growth index group -0,383 -2,152
***
0,048
***
0,016 -0,464 -0,683 -2,320
***
-0,030
***
0,017 -0,668
(-1,22) (-3,43) (7,84) (0,88) (-0,37) (-1,35) (-2,62) (-2,64) (0,55) (-0,52) 
Estimators (pooled OLS estimator) 
Fixed-effects estimator -0,335 0,390 0,056
***
0,026
***
0,029 0,204 -2,147 0,109
***
0,139
***
0,479
(-0,66) (0,29) (7,61) (2,62) (0,07) (0,16) (-0,58) (7,09) (5,97) (0,45) 
Random-effects estimator 0,056 0,963 0,038
***
0,001 -0,002 -0,799 -10,071
***
-0,137
***
-0,100
**
0,214
(0,11) (0,76) (6,45) (0,08) (-0,01) (-0,97) (-6,82) (-4,86) (-2,46) (0,30) 
Selected models (non-selected models) 0,083 -1,063 0,039 -0,005 0,012 - - - - -
(0,17) (-0,84) (0,77) (-0,57) (0,03)
Number of observations - -2,220 0,021
***
-0,021 0,256 - 3,573 -0,006 -0,021 1,062
  (-0,82) (3,03) (-1,20) (0,28) (0,60) (-0,29) (-0,63) (0,76)  
 Dependent variable Effects of ownership transformation (all models) Effects of ownership tranformation (selected models) 
Estimator WLS    [N] 
WLS    
[s.e.] 
Random 
effects  
RML
Random 
effects  
MM
Mixed effects 
RML 
WLS   
[N] 
WLS   
[s.e.] 
Random 
effects  
RML
Random 
effects  
MM
Mixed 
effects  
RML 
Independent variable (default 
category)/model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
N 3546 3546 3546 3546 3546 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Adjusted R2 0,042 0,214 - - - 0,042 0,225 - - -
F-test 9,57 *** 51,66 *** - - - 4,02 *** 20,10 *** - - -
Wald test - - 1137,89
***
555,36
***
157,79
***
- - 1114,88
***
257,57
***
52,37*** 
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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